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In this paper, we analyze and integrate the production process of “hot-dip galvanized steel 
pipe”, the main product in the case enterprise and builds a model for the production scheduling 
with Cooperative Game Theory from the perspective of the enterprise. In order to get the Opti-
mal Game Scheduling Solution, Genetic algorithm is used and Shaply value thought and β rule 
allocation method are combined to solve the problem of increased profit allocation in different 
customers. And fair and reasonable allocation mechanism is of great significance to the stability 
of the coalition and enterprise development.
Keywords:� Galvanizing Pipe Production, Cooperative Game Theory, Genetic algorithm.
Проанализирован  процесс производства горячеоцинкованных стальных труб,   основного 
продукта предприятия, построена  модель планирования производства при помощи 
кооперативной теории игр с точки зрения предприятия. Чтобы получить оптимальное 
решение используется генетический алгоритм. Метод построения значений Shaply и метод 
распределения правил β объединяются для решения проблемы увеличения распределения 
прибыли у разных клиентов, что  имеет большое значение для стабильности развития 
предприятий.
Дослідження питань виробництва гальванічних труб Yingying Li, Shaohua Dong 
Проаналізовано процес виробництва гарячеоцинкованим сталевих труб, основного 
продукту підприємства, побудована модель планування виробництва за допомогою 
кооперативної теорії ігор з точки зору підприємства. Щоб отримати оптимальне рішення 
використовується генетичний алгоритм. Метод побудови значень Shaply і метод розподілу 
правил β об’єднуються для вирішення проблеми збільшення розподілу прибутку у різних 
клієнтів, що має велике значення для стабільності розвитку підприємств.
1. ������������
 The concept of computer integrated 
manufacturing system (CIMS) is put forward 
by Dr. Joseph Harrington firstly in 1973. Pro-
duction scheduling technology is one of key and 
core technologies of CIMS [1]. Production sched-
uling has been widely concerned because of its 
important place in enterprise production man-
agement in recent decades. Experts and schol-
ars in the field of production scheduling have 
proposed a series of research methods to solve 
all kinds of production scheduling problems. 
Such as some traditional scheduling methods 
(e.g. mechanical optimization method, simula-
tion method) and intelligent scheduling meth-
ods (e.g. genetic algorithm, swarm intelligence 
algorithm, neural network algorithm). These 
methods have achieved good results in the field 
of production management, and have made 
contributions to raising the level of production 
management. The Game Theory proposed and 
developed in the middle of 20th century is main-
ly used to solve the problem of interests balance 
between enterprises and customers and among 
multiple customers. Meanwhile, the production 
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scheduling is a typical problem of resource al-
location and competition with constraints and 
optimization index requirements where there 
are a lot of conflicts among customers, custom-
ers and enterprises. Therefore Game Theory 
has become a good tool to describe the schedul-
ing problem. The game is generally divided into 
non-cooperative game and cooperative game. 
Non-cooperative game highlights the concept 
of individual competition, emphasizing the in-
dividual rationality, while in the cooperative 
game, the agents can reach a binding agree-
ment to carry out a coalition. Cooperative game 
embodies the spirit of teamwork, emphasizing 
the collective rationality.
Tijs (1986) used the cooperative game the-
ory to solve the problem of cost saving in pro-
duction scheduling, and proposed the cost dif-
ference allocation method based on τ value in 
the scheduling problem[2]. Curiel et al. (1989) 
started a line of research that investigates the 
interaction between sequencing situations and 
cooperative games. They considered the class of 
one-machine sequencing situations in which no 
restrictions like due dates and ready times are 
imposed on the jobs and the weighted comple-
tion time was chosen as the cost criterion [3]. 
Zhou (2012) allocated saving costs reasonably 
by cooperation theory in the game of one-ma-
chine scheduling with due-date and tardiness 
penalty[4].
In the literature review of the game sched-
uling problems are standing in the customers’ 
point of view, however in this paper, the pro-
duction process of a steel pipe enterprise’s main 
product “Hot dip galvanized steel pipe” is as an 
example to study, in which we analyze the con-
tribution of customers to increasing the profit 
of the case enterprise with cooperative game 
theory to help to adjust customer strategy ac-
cordingly.
2. C��pe�a��ve game m��el �f galva-
��z��g p�pe p���������
The galvanizing process is classified and 
integrated in consideration of the actual situ-
ation in the enterprise. Integrated galvanizing 
process is displayed in Table 1. Taking full ac-
count of the properties of the works, the inte-
grated galvanizing process is considered as a 
single machine model. Before modeling, the as-
sumptions are as follows:
1. Ade�uate supply of raw materials is as�q -      
sured;
2. Customers’ payment of accepting the co-
alition is not more than the payment of reject-
ing the coalition;
3. Each galvanizing task belongs to only one 
customer;
4. Galvanizing tasks arrive at the same 
time. There is no waiting time;  
5. The enterprise provides an initial sched-
uling order before the beginning of galvanizing 
with a view to the due dates and the weight 
of the customers. Under the initial order, once 
the delivery time of one task exceeds the due 
date, the task will be rejected, and the profit 
that this task brings to the enterprise is 0 si-
multaneously;
6. If one customer accepts the coalition, the 
delivery time of each task of this customer in 
the coalition is allowed to be later than the due 
date, but not later than the deadline. If not, the 
profit of the task is 0;
7. The machine can only carry out one task at 
the same time. The task can be neither stopped 
early nor preempted by other tasks;
8. The time of starting galvanizing is 0.  
Based on the above assumptions, the 
mathematical model of galvanizing pro-
duction scheduling problem is given. The 
problem can be described as an eight tuple
( , , , , , , , )N l T R ED LD Fσ0 . N represents the set 
of galvanizing tasks, in which galvanizing tasks 
are called agents.. l,  the machine set, is set to 
1 in the model.R is defined as galvanizing time 
set.σ0,  a sort of N is seen as initial schedul-
ing order from the enterprise. ED  and LD  are 
due-dates set and deadlines set, respectively.
F i( )  is to be interpreted as the penalty function 
when the delivery time of i-th task is between
ED i( ) and LD i( ) . According to the customers’ 
orders, the profit that the enterprise get from 
productions and sales is defined as follows:
 U Ri' =å  (1)
 R q p c Fi i i i i= ´ - -( )  (2)
Table 1. Integrated Galvanizing Process
Serial Number Process Name Process Description
1 Pickling Picking ,washing and drying pipes
2 Galvanizing Galvanizing the pipes in zinc liquid
3 Passivation Drying the galvanized pipes and spreading the passivator  on the pipe surface
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 F f T EDi i i i= ´ -( )   (3)
where for all i N p c qi i iÎ , , ,  and fi  are repre-
sented the unit price , the quantity, the penalty 
of i-th specification galvanized pipe respec-
tively. Given the initial orderσ0,we have the 
initial profit of the enterprise:
 U q p ci i i0 = ´ -å ' ( )   (4)
 q q T ED
T EDi
i i i
i i
' ,
,
=
- £
- >
ì
í
ïï
îïï
0
0 0
 (5) 
where if the delivery time of i-th task exceeds 
the due date, the quantity qi'  is 0, otherwise 
is qi . In the cooperative gaming, the increased 
profit after re�order is given:
 U U U= -max( )' 0  (6)
The ultimate goal of the cooperative game 
model in this paper is to maximize the in-
creased value of enterprise profit. Since the 
enterprise profits under the initial order σ0  
can be calculated, the goal of cooperative game 
model is transformed into maximizing the value 
of U' . When satisfying the following constraints 
and making U' max, the scheduling solution is 
called the optimal game scheduling solution for 
the galvanized production in this model:
 T LD i ni i- £ = ×××0 1 2, , , ,  (7) 
The profit each task contributes in the coali-
tion will be analyzed in detail in section 4. Heu-
ristic genetic algorithm will be used to solve the 
cooperative game model in the next section for 
improving convergence speed.
3. S�lv��g �he ���pe�a��ve game m��el 
�f galva��z��g p�pe p���������
The previous section we introduced the prob-
lem of galvanizing production scheduling and 
used the cooperative game theory to establish 
a cooperative game scheduling model based on 
the maximization of enterprise’s profit. In this 
section we will use the genetic algorithm to 
solve the model, and provide method support 
for the allocation of profit in the next section. 
The genetic algorithm flow is as follows:
(1) Coding design
Firstly, the model is coded according to 
the following rule: the Galvanizing tasks of n  
specifications are se�uential encoded from 1 to 
n  under the initial order of σ0 .A chromosome 
containing n  genes is obtained.
(2) Fitness function design
The goal of the cooperative game model 
established in the previous section is to maxi-
mize the profit of the enterprise. Therefore, the 
maximumU gmax' and minimum U gmin' are selected 
in the g-th generation to compose the fitness 
function:
 fitness i U U
U U
i
g g
g g
c( ) (
.
)
'
min
'
max
'
min
'
= -
- + 0 001
  (8)
where Ui g' is the enterprise’s profit under the i  
order in the g-th  generation, and c is the nor-
malized phase-out acceleration index.
Table 2. Example Order Information
Task 
Num-
ber
Cus-
tomer 
Number
Specifications Weight, t Unit Cost,  Yuan/t
Unit Price,  
Yuan/t
Due- date, 
h
Deadline,  
h
Penalty Cost, 
Yuan/h
1 1 114.0´3.75´6.0 341.73 2894.87 2965.90 103.80 186.84 122.06
2 1 140.0´4.0´6.0 33.73 2944.36 3188.00 98.95 148.43 21.73
3 1 26.3´2.5´6.0 38.25 2866.56 3502.39 54.75 87.60 40.79
4 2 33.5´3.25´6.0 27.52 2758.90 3290.02 52.64 73.69 43.01
5 2 42.0´2.75´6.0 120.81 2851.03 3323.17 89.71 116.63 149.17
6 2 42.0´3.0´6.0 139.90 2673.58 3278.43 102.32 133.02 149.41
7 2 47.0´2.5´6.0 26.16 2854.97 3332.50 85.89 154.61 12.69
8 3 47.5´3.0´6.0 117.60 2752.20 3258.46 86.65 155.98 55.28
9 3 47.5´3.25´6.0 46.73 2841.91 3213.75 97.57 175.62 19.24
10 4 75.0´3.0´6.0 24.83 3029.24 3060.01 87.33 157.19 10.88
11 4 75.0´3.25´6.0 85.54 2950.75 3000.58 91.32 164.37 35.13
12 4 75.0´3.5´6.0 118.79 2859.98 2969.51 93.80 150.08 62.67
13 4 114.0´3.25´6.0 45.54 3002.84 3041.34 84.19 115.91 43.66
14 5 114.0´3.5´6.0 331.63 2958.61 2994.19 128.28 177.57 201.44
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(3) Selection, Crossover and Mutation Op-
erator
The roulette method is chosen to generate 
the selection operator. The crossover operator 
uses a single point of crossover. The mutation 
operator is obtained by comparing the random 
probability with the mutation probability Pm
.When the random probability is less than Pm
, the random number method is used to gener-
ate a task number to replace the existing task 
number of the gene. 
(4) Algorithm Flow
Based on the above analysis of significant 
steps of genetic algorithm, the genetic algo-
rithm flow is given in Fig.1.
 In order to verify the rationality and 
correctness of the galvanization cooperative 
game model in the previous section and the so-
lution designed in this section, in this paper, 
we use Matlab software to simulate the experi-
ment. In the experiment, we integrate multiple 
production lines into a production line in the 
galvanizing workshop, and 14 kinds of specifi-
cations need to be galvanized after integrating 
and classifying the customer orders. Table 2 
shows the example order information. The ex-
perimental parameters are set as follows: the 
population is 100, the number of generations is 
200, normalized phase-out acceleration index is 
set to be 2, crossover probability is 0.75 and the 
mutation probability is 0.2. 
According to the above genetic algorithm 
parameters settings and order information, ge-
netic algorithm simulation convergence curve is 
shown in Fig. 2. With the combination of the max-
imum profit of the enterpriseU' .= 325009 50  
and the profit in the initial scheduling order 
U0 254753 60= . , the increase of enterprise profit 
is U=70255 90.  and rises 27.6%.
It can be seen from the simulation results 
that the profit from the optimized production 
scheduling order is considerably higher than 
from the initial order. As the promotion of 
profit is based on the customer coalition, it is 
important to study which customers join in the 
coalition and the contribution of each customer 
in the coalition for adjusting the customer re-
lationship management strategy. In the next 
section, we will focus on the analysis of the 
coalition’s profit allocation.
4. Galva��ze� p��������� game ��al�-
tion profit allocation
After obtaining the optimal scheduling solu-
tion of the cooperative game model, it is neces-
sary to allocate the profit rationally. A reason-
able allocation mechanism is of great signifi-
cance to the stability of the coalition. All of the 
contributors in the coalition can benefit from 
the allocation. The profit allocation mechanism 
should apply the following rules:
(1) Collective Principle
Under the optimal cooperative game sched-
uling σ b  the total profit is not less than the to-
tal profit under other scheduling, that is, the 
optimal cooperative game scheduling solution 
can maximize the profit. Meanwhile, the profit 
margin must be fully allocated among all of the 
participating agents, and there is no surplus.
Fig. 1. Genetic algorithm flow chart
Fig. 2. Genetic algorithm simulation conver-
gence curve
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(2) Individual Rationality Principle
The cost savings of the customer after joining 
the coalition must be nonnegative, which is the 
prerequisite for the formation of the coalition. 
And the relevant assumptions have been made 
in the cooperative game model in this paper. 
(3) No Damage Principle
When the customers in the coalition is part 
of the all customers, the interests of non�affili-
ated customers can’t be damaged. 
(4) Fairness Principle
The fairness and reasonability are reflected 
in the following the allocation strategy: The 
more contribution the customers make, the 
more profit they should be allocated, and the 
customer who makes no contribution can’t par-
ticipate in the allocation of profits. 
According to the above principles and the 
situation of the enterprise, this paper will in-
troduce two kinds of key cooperative game allo-
cation methods: Shapley value method and β  
rule allocation method.
(1) Shapley Value
The Shapley value proposed by Shapley 
in 1953 solved the allocation in the coopera-
tive game reasonably and fairly. The status of 
Sharply value in cooperative game is equiva-
lent to the status of Nash equilibrium in non-
cooperative game. The main ideas of Sharply 
value are described as follows: 
It is assumed that agents in the cooperative 
game can form a perfect coalition, and the num-
ber order of agents in the game is       ( , ,..., ),1 2 n  
we get:
x v1 1= ({ })
x v v2 1 2 1= -({ , }) ({ })
x v v3 1 2 3 1 2= -({ , , }) ({ , })

x v N v N nn = -({ }) ( ,{ })
It leads to an allocation ofx x x xn= ( , , , ),1 2   
which is related to the number of agents in the 
coalition. Reassigning the number of the agents 
in the coalition, we will receive another alloca-
tion under this numbering. With any numbering 
mode, the income of each agent can be obtained 
by getting the difference between the income of 
the coalition after the agent joined and before 
he joined. And the number of numbering modes 
is n ! in a coalition with n  agents. Therefore, 
when defining the coalition after agent i  joined 
asM iÈ { } , the incomeϕi v( ) that i  should be al-
located is the average of incomes he got in n !  
allocations [5]:
ϕi v
M N M
N
v M i v M
M N i
( )
| | !(| | | | ) !
| | !
[ ( { }) ( )]
{ }
=
- -
È -
Ì -
å 1  
  (9)
ϕi
M N i
v W M v M i v M( ) ( )[ ( { }) ( )]
{ }
= È -
Ì -
å  (10)
(2) β  rule allocation method
The β rule allocation method is a allocation 
method proposed by Curiel[3] in studying se-
�uence game. Above all, we define several sets 
about order σ0 :
P i( , )σ0 : the set of agents in front of i
P i( , )σ0 : the set of agents in front of i  add-
ing i
F i( , )σ0 : the set of agents behind of i
F i( , )σ0 : the set of agents behind of i  add-
ing i
The income of i -th agent is derived from the 
following formula:
β
σ σ σ σ
i v
P i P i F i F i
( )
[ ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , )]
=
= - + -1
2 0 0 0 0
  (11)
It can be seen from the above formula that 
the income obtained by each agent i is the aver-
age of the marginal revenue value obtained by 
adding i  to the coalition in front of i and add-
ing to the coalition behind i . 
Weighted marginal cost allocate rule on pre-
decessors and followers (WMCA), the alloca-
tion method combined by above two methods, 
is used in this paper and defined as follows: 
 
β λ σ σ
λ σ σ
i v P i P i
F i F i
( ) [ ( , ) ( , )]
( )[ ( , ) ( , )]
= - +
+ - -
0 0
0 01
  (12)
where λ  is the weighting coefficient, and 
λ Î [ , ]0 1 . The value of λ  reflects the urgency 
of the agent’s re�uest for advance processing.
In the previous section, the total profit of 
the enterprise under the initial order and the 
optimal game scheduling order based on Table 
2 have been obtained. Since the different galva-
nizing tasks belong to different customers, the 
total contribution of each customer is the sum 
of the contributions of the customer’s galvaniz-
ing tasks. The profit the enterprise get from all 
of the connected task coalitions are shown in 
Table 3.
In the light of the Formula(12), Table 4 dis-
played the contributions of different galvaniz-
ing tasks by taking the λ = 0.6. From the results 
of the allocation, we can see from the results of 
the allocation that the tasks numbered 2,3,4,5 
have no contribution to the promotion of profit, 
which implies the change of processing order of 
this four tasks has no effect on the profit pro-
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motion. And this statement is confirmed in the 
reality of that there is no change of the order of 
this 4 tasks in optimal game scheduling order 
[13,2,3,4,5,7,12,11,10,8,6,14,9,1].
The total sum of customers’ contributions is 
70255.90 Yuan, that is, all of the profit alloca-
tion is completed.
5. C���l�s���s
In this paper, we take the production pro-
cess of the main product “hot-dip galvanized 
steel pipe” in the case enterprise as a research 
object and analyze the contribution of each 
customer to the improvement of the enterprise 
profit with cooperative game theory, which is of 
great significance to the stability of the coali-
tion and the development of the enterprise. For 
the tasks of non-expired, their contributed prof-
it can be all owned by the enterprise, while for 
the tasks of overdue, the enterprise can make 
compensation for the corresponding customers, 
which help the enterprise retain customers in 
the environment with steel-making overcapac-
ity currently.
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